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Abstract This paper asks whether it is possible to derive a concern for future
generations (‘‘sustainability’’) from an account of the firm as a social contract (SC)
among its stakeholders. Two aspects of a leading SC model of the firm limit its
usefulness for an analysis of sustainability. First, the stakeholders provide invest-
ments to the firm over time. Second, the relationship between contemporaries and
future generations is marked by asymmetries of power and knowledge that need to
be considered while reconstructing the SC today. I discuss three reformulations of
the SC that are all, in principle, capable of introducing within the SC a concern for
future generations. The first describes the contractors as heads of families. The
second envisages a grand meeting of stakeholders of all generations. The third,
which I find most defensible, views the SC as an ahistorical agreement reached
behind a thick veil of ignorance. This agreement is based on John Rawls’s norm of
reciprocity, whereby the stakeholders adopt today the decision they wish all pre-
vious (and future) generations had made regarding the rate of consumption of
natural resources and emission of pollutants.
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1 Introduction
The modern large business company has gained importance as a major emitter of
pollutants and user of natural resources. Heede (2014) finds that 90 companies (50
of which investor-owned and the rest under state control) caused 63% of human-
made emissions between 1751 and 2010. About half of these emissions were
produced since 1986, a clear sign that companies are increasingly responsible for
emissions. James Gustave Speth aptly remarked that: ‘‘If capitalism is a growth
machine, corporations are doing the growing. If growth is destroying the
environment, then corporations are doing most of the destroying’’ (Speth 2008, p.
165). The firm’s role as polluter and user of natural resources is an instance of its
ability to make an impact on the rights and welfare of a variety of groups and
individuals, the ‘‘stakeholders’’ of the firm.1 The term sustainability (cf. WCED
1987) refers to the need to ensure that current decisions by individuals and
organizations regarding emissions and use of natural resources will not have a
negative impact on the welfare of future generations. Sustainability is a topic that
has attracted a large body of research in business studies (cf. e.g., Fox et al. 2010;
Steurer et al. 2005; DesJardins 1998; Jeurissen and Keijzers 2004; Shrivastava
1995) as well as in economics (cf. the essays in Roemer and Suzumura 2007 and
Endres 2010, Part 6).
While trying to articulate their obligations to the stakeholders of the firm, present
and future, managers might find themselves locked in a moral dilemma about the
effect of any decision they make on some category (cf. Jensen 2001). Social
contract2 models in business ethics and economics have emerged as a possible
answer to this problem. The two most influential models of the social contract of the
stakeholders, Sacconi (2006) and Donaldson and Dunfee (1999), do not explicitly
address, however, the problem of the firm’s obligations to future generations. This
paper hopes to fill this gap by analyzing three reformulations of the social contract.
The first views the stakeholders as heads of families concerned with their progeny.
The second views the social contract as the result of a grand meeting of stakeholders
from all generations. The third, which I find most defensible, views the social
contract as the result of a hypothetical meeting of current stakeholders, who adopt a
thick veil of ignorance.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Sect. 2 I briefly review a leading social
contract account of the firm, Lorenzo Sacconi’s. I focus on this model because it
incorporates a bargaining problem among the stakeholders from which an objective
for the firm is derived. I then offer an assessment of this objective from the point of
view of the sustainability agenda. After having argued that the model’s usefulness is
limited in this regard, I move to possible amendments to the SC (Sect. 3). I then
1 A stakeholder is any ‘‘identifiable group or individual who can affect the achievement of an
organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s objective’’ (Freeman
and Reed 1983, p. 91).
2 I use in the paper the term ‘‘social contract’’ instead of ‘‘contractarianism’’ and ‘‘contractualism’’ (Barry
1989), often found in the literature. Contractarianism is the brand of social contract ethics associated with
the idea of a mutually advantageous agreement. Contractualism is the brand stressing instead the
impartiality of the agreement. I return to this distinction in Sect. 4.
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discuss in greater details the notion of reciprocity, which is central to one of the
proposals. Final remarks follow.
2 The SC of the current stakeholders
In works that have spanned a decade, Lorenzo Sacconi has developed a social
contract approach to the problem of choice regarding the governance structure and
the objective of the firm (cf. especially Sacconi 2006, 2007, also Mansell 2013 and
Francés-Gómez and Del Rio 2008). I focus on the implications of Sacconi’s model
for the future generations, with no hope to make justice to the full scope of
Sacconi’s analysis.
Sacconi’s SC is specified in two steps. The first social contract is a hypothetical
bargaining situation among the stakeholders where force and fraud are not allowed,
and every stakeholder can drop out in case the agreement leaves him/her worse off
than the status quo. The first SC is a constitutional-level agreement among the
stakeholders to setup a generic ‘‘union,’’ once the stakeholders recognize that
cooperation with each other is beneficial. The second SC is an agreement about who
will run the firm. This agreement also contains provisions regarding the appropriate
corporate objective function for a multi-stakeholder organization, which must be per
the solution to the bargaining game in the first step. In the second step, all
stakeholders agree to accept the authority of the shareholders, or of the directors the
shareholders appoint, if the shareholders commit to pursue an enlarged objective for
the firm:
1. The paramount objective is to refrain from activities that generate negative
externalities on individuals or groups that do not directly participate in the
dealings of the firm. If the negative externalities are ‘‘essential for the
production of the cooperative surplus’’ (Sacconi 2006, p. 275), appropriate
forms of compensation need to be devised so that the external parties remain ex
post ‘‘neutral.’’
2. In second order, the shareholders or their appointees ought to formulate
corporate policies that distribute the surplus produced by the firm in an
equitable manner, according to the solution to the bargaining problem in the
first SC.
3. Within the subset of options for the firm that survive the first two headings, the
shareholders will seek maximum remuneration of their investment.
Those who do not participate in the transactions of the firm, but still face negative
consequences because of its activities, are among the weakest of the stakeholders. In
the absence of the elimination of these externalities, or of compensation for them,
these categories will bear costs without receiving any benefit. The first heading of
the objective function tries to create safeguards for these groups.
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2.1 Some open questions in Sacconi’s model
Time is a dimension that is often absent from SC accounts (cf. Attas 2008; also
Arenas and Rodrigo 2016 who talk about ‘‘presentism’’). A question that is left open
in Sacconi’s model is whether future generations participate in the formation of the
first social contract. This seems not be the case. To be consistent with a meaningful
idea of ‘‘bargaining,’’ the first SC needs to be an assembly of contemporaneous
stakeholders. If, instead, it were the case that future generations of stakeholders
participated in the formation of the hypothetical agreement, this would open the
door to a set of questions that also deserve attention. The second heading of the
objective function, asking managers to maximize and divide equitably the coop-
erative surplus, would now imply maximizing and distributing the (expected) sum
of the present as well as future surpluses, a summation that would have to be
truncated either by assuming a finite number of generations, or a discount rate. Both
issues, i.e., how many generations we are willing to consider and discounting, are
moral questions in themselves, and they have been discussed extensively in the
sustainability literature (cf. e.g., Asheim 2010 and Stern 2007).
Sacconi’s analysis seems to imply, therefore, that the SC is reached among
coeval stakeholders. The assumption of coevality has implications for the future
generations. If it is common knowledge among the stakeholders that all of them
belong to the same generation, it would then be optimal to decide to exploit all
resources available today, leaving no form of capital, natural or otherwise, for
tomorrow (de Shalit 1995, p. 96), provided that the contractors are not endowed
with a preexisting concern for future generations. One might point out that the
stakeholders might belong to different age groups, or might envision becoming old
if they are currently young, a point raised by English (1977) and Gauthier (1986).
Each contractor would then maximize welfare over the entire expected lifespan, not
knowing whether one will be ‘‘young,’’ ‘‘middle-aged’’ or ‘‘elderly.’’ This approach
has, however, the undesirable implication that we should only save for the duration
of a reasonable life. This approach to sustainability is, therefore, unhelpful in
addressing the consequences of our actions on faraway generations.
A further issue is, if the production of an externality is ‘‘essential’’ from the point
of view of the current generation (cf. Sacconi 2006, p. 275), is it justifiable and
possible to look for a form of compensation that will render future generations
neutral? The current generation is likely to face a moral dilemma in this regard,
considering the difficulty in attributing preferences and tastes to future generations.
Barry (1977, p. 273) was among the first to notice that the relationship between the
contemporaries and future generations is characterized by an asymmetry of
knowledge and power. The current generation may not wish to impose preferences
on future generations of stakeholders, as we are unable to empathize with them
fully. To mitigate the asymmetry of knowledge, we might opt at the societal level
for a nondeclining stock of natural resources. This would meet Barry’s suggestion
that ‘‘we don’t know what the precise tastes of our remote descendants will be, but
they are unlikely to include a desire for skin cancer, soil erosion [...] And, other
things being equal, the interests of future generations cannot be harmed by our
leaving them more choices rather than fewer’’ (id, p. 247). In a recent contribution,
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critical of Richard DeGeorge’s claim that ‘‘what does not exist now cannot now
have rights in any strong sense’’ (cited in Nickel 2015, p. 720), Nickel (2015)
presents a compelling case for the rights of future persons, claiming that we can
come up with a set of duties, albeit ‘‘imperfect’’ ones, asking us not to bequeath to
the next generations a planet in severely depleted conditions (cf. also Tremmel
2009, pp. 47–63). The asymmetry of knowledge between today’s generation and the
future generations cannot be used by the stakeholders, therefore, as the theoretical
backdrop that would allow the use of unsustainable corporate practices today.
The asymmetry of power between the current generation of stakeholders and the
future generations of stakeholders of the same firm can be made more explicit by
looking at the interdependence between the bargaining problem among the
stakeholders today and the bargaining problem among stakeholders in the future:3
1. The solution to the bargaining problem among today’s stakeholders depends on
the ‘‘disagreement point,’’ the utility that the ideal contractors obtain if they fail
to reach an agreement. This ‘‘reservation utility’’ is not guaranteed to be always
the same over time, due to historical and technological considerations. The state
of the physical environment also influences the location of the disagreement
point in the utility space within which a solution to the bargaining game among
the stakeholders is found in Sacconi’s first SC.
2. The utility space might shrink because of environmental damage and
anthropogenic climate change in particular (cf. e.g., Stern 2007). This
consideration does not necessarily imply that some duty exists upon the
contemporaries to keep the bargaining space constant over time, an operation
that might well turn out to be impossible due, e.g., to technological change and
population increases. The effect of current decisions on the shape of the future
generations’ bargaining space is an exemplification of the asymmetric power of
the present generation to interfere with posterity.
It is hopefully clear at this point that the SC in one of its most advanced available
formulations does not provide sufficient guidance to managers regarding the
treatment of future generations of stakeholders. Decisions taken per the SC will
imply certain levels of emission of pollutants and use of natural resources. In short,
the social contract of (today’s) stakeholders has an ecological footprint.4 The
inadequacy of the current formulation of the SC in addressing the problem of our
duties to posterity is most likely due to two specific aspects deserving further study.
The first is the interdependence between the bargaining among the contemporaries
3 An alternative approach would be to consider a grand bargaining game including representatives of all
generations. I discuss this problematic possibility in the next section.
4 An operational definition of ecological footprint is ‘‘the aggregate area of land and water [...] that is
claimed by participants in the economy to produce all the resources they consume, and to absorb all the
wastes they generate on a continuing basis, using prevailing technology’’ (Wackernagel and Rees 1997, p.
7). Hart (1995) discusses the notion of ‘‘management of the organizational ecological footprint,’’
instances of which are pollution prevention (‘‘minimize emissions, effluents and waste,’’ p. 992), product
stewardship (guidance as to the ‘‘selection of raw materials and [...] product design with the objective of
minimizing the environmental impact of product systems,’’ p. 996) and ‘‘sustainable development,’’
defined here as ‘‘minimizing the environmental burden of firm growth and development’’ (p. 992).
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and the bargaining within each future generation I have briefly discussed above. The
second relates to the view of the firm that underlies Sacconi’s SC, i.e., a nexus of
specific investments provided once and for all (cf. Grossman and Hart 1986). Firms
seem, however, closer to being a stream of investments provided by different
generations of stakeholders. The Delaware General Corporation Law at section 122
states that a corporation has: ‘‘perpetual succession by its corporate name, unless a
limited period of duration is stated in its certificate of incorporation,’’ a sign that
corporate law typically defaults corporations to no pre-defined duration. In practice
firms do not last forever as a result, among other causes, of shifting market
conditions and managerial mistakes. Setting a deadline for the company’s activities
seems, however, impractical, and possibly illegal. Social contract models of the firm
need to meet the challenge of the firm’s perduration in time.
3 The amended SC
In this section, I discuss three possible reformulations of the first SC. All these
reformulations are, in theory, capable of generating obligations to future genera-
tions, through different theoretical approaches. I evaluate each reformulation of the
SC according to two criteria.
The first criterion asks that any reformulation of the SC be coherent with the
hypothetical agreement methodology of SC ethics (cf. Van Oosterhout et al. 2006),
based on the fictitious constructs of the ‘‘original position’’ and of the ‘‘veil of
ignorance’’ proposed by Rawls (1971). These devices are meant to help men and
women discover which theory of justice ‘‘specifies the most appropriate principles
for realizing liberty and equality once society is viewed as a fair system of
cooperation between free and equal citizens’’(Rawls 2005, p. 22). These principles
shape what Rawls calls the basic structure of society, i.e., ‘‘a society’s main
political, social and economic institutions and how they fit together into one unified
system of social cooperation from one generation to the next’’ (Rawls 2005, p. 11).
The first SC described by Sacconi is an application of Rawls’s original position to
the problem of how corporate governance ensures an equitable treatment of the
stakeholders. The implicit, and controversial, assumption of this approach is that
corporate governance is an institution of the basic structure of society (cf. also Blanc
and Al-Amoudi 2013 and, contra, Singer 2015).
Rawls noticed that the time dimension ‘‘subjects any ethical theory to severe if
not impossible tests’’ (Rawls 1971, p. 251). Overcoming ‘‘positional limitations’’ (a
concept discussed in Sen 2011, p. 155–173) in the original position appears
challenging in the case of choices that involve several agents living at the same
time; it seems an even harder exercise in the case of decisions that produce effects
on future generations, such as the decisions about emission levels and the use of
natural resources. To ease this challenge, the second criterion asks that the amended
SC be ‘‘representable’’ by those who are granted decision-making power in the firm.
In the words of Rawls, the original position is a ‘‘device of representation’’ (cf.
Rawls 2005, p. 27) rather than a physical place. The simulation that the decision
makers need to engage in needs to contain enough details to allow managers to set
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apart those decisions about corporate policy that fulfill the terms of the hypothetical
contract from those that do not. This criterion essentially tries to ensure that any
reformulation of the SC will be of potential practical relevance for the corporate
decision makers.
3.1 Proposal 1: contractors as heads of families
In this version of the SC the contractors are good family men (or women) who
take an interest in their offspring, an approach pioneered by John Rawls in A
Theory of Justice (abbreviated as the Theory). In the Theory Rawls asks whether
the contractors in the original position ‘‘have obligations and duties to third
parties, for example, to their immediate descendants’’ (Rawls 1971, p. 111), a
point I have already discussed in relation to the implicit assumption of coevality
in Sacconi’s first SC. To cope with this difficulty, Rawls argues that the decision
makers in the original position care about their immediate successors, behaving as
family lines:
We can adopt a motivation assumption and think of the parties as representing
a continuing line of claims. For example, we can assume that they are heads of
families and therefore have a desire to further the well-being of at least their
more immediate descendants (Rawls 1971, p. 111).
The norm that summarizes this reformulation of the SC is:
Norm 1 Choose regarding the rate of consumption of natural resources and the
rate of emissions as a good family man (or woman) would.
The family line assumption has been criticized as ad hoc to justify our caring for
posterity.5 The assumption implies lifting the veil of ignorance (in violation of the
first criterion of evaluation) to find out that one has a progeny, a feature that must be
common knowledge among the contractors if the bargaining is to be carried out
among equals. Even assuming a general caring for one’s descendants, the extent of
this caring appears bound to decline as we look further into the future of humanity.
3.2 Proposal 2: grand assembly of all contractors
In this alternative reformulation of the SC all the stakeholders belonging to all
generations of human history, past, present and future, meet in the original position.
To be coherent with the original position methodology, each contractor should not
know to which particular generation he/she belongs to, provided that it is common
knowledge that all generations are in fact represented. Barry (1977) proposed this
argument in response to Rawls’s analysis in the Theory.
The agreement, once reached, appears to have a strong moral legitimation, i.e.,
the consent of all generations. The norm that is implied by this contract is:
5 Rawls himself recognized this in Political Liberalism (Rawls 2005, p. 20–21).
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Norm 2 Choose regarding the rate of consumption of natural resources and the
rate of emissions in such a way that the representatives of all generations
would consent to.6
Once the first SC is described as a grand gathering of stakeholders from all
generations, the first heading of Sacconi’s corporate objective function would
require that managers refrain from producing externalities that negatively affect
individuals or groups from the present and the future, or that appropriate
compensation be paid to such parties. The second heading would ask managers to
give equitable remuneration to the stakeholders of all ages. The third would ask the
managers to maximize the payoff of the shareholders, possibly only the present
ones. It is unlikely that anybody would be able to simulate any such situation, and
carry out the moral duties that descend from it, in violation of the second criterion of
evaluation. The simulation exercise could be simplified by restricting attention to a
finite and short number of future generations of stakeholders. The choice of where
to draw the line, i.e., how many generations we are willing to consider, seems,
however, arbitrary.
3.3 Proposal 3: an ahistorical SC
In this reformulation, the contractors have no information on the stock of natural
assets and productive resources available to them when deliberating in the original
position. This ‘‘ahistorical’’ (or nonhistorical) SC was originally proposed in
Rawls’s Political Liberalism (Rawls 2005), the last and definitive statement of
Rawls’s social contract ethics. The practice of oblivion of one’s characteristics
(gender, age, income, etc.) in the original position extends easily to the amount of
natural resources in one’s availability. Rawls viewed all these contingencies as the
result of a historical accident. True impartiality requires the neglect of all
contingencies: the veil of ignorance is supposed to be thick, rather than thin, i.e., the
parties are to conceive of each other only as moral beings, in a sort of ‘‘deliberative
vacuum’’ (Rawls 2005, p. 273).
Rawls points out that the norm of behavior that is singled out in the ahistorical
SC is the norm of reciprocity (cf. Sect. 4), which can be summarized as follows:
Norm 3 Choose regarding the rate of consumption of natural resources and the
rate of emissions in the same way you wish all previous and future
generations of stakeholders had.
Rawls introduces reciprocity as the principle:
which the members of any generation (and so all generations) would adopt as
the one their generation is to follow and as the principle they would want
preceding generations to have followed (and later generations to follow), no
matter how far back (or forward) in time (Rawls 2005, p. 274).
6 It remains unclear whether the assembly should include all the actual generations, or both the actual
and the hypothetical generations (cf. Pontara 1995, pp. 81–89). The inclusion of hypothetical generations
seems, however, to make the simulation exercise even more complex.
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In this reformulation of the SC, considerations related to the time in which the
contractors enter the original position, as well as to the presence of representatives
of past and future generations, all lose relevance thanks to the ‘‘thick’’ veil of
ignorance the contractors assume.
This reformulation is fully compatible with the general rational bargaining
methodology (the first criterion), blinding the contractors to a bigger set of
personal features. It also seems clear in the exercise it asks the managers to
carry out, i.e. the simulation of a hypothetical, voluntary bargaining situation
among stakeholders that are blinded to their features and circumstances.
The ‘‘ahistorical’’ nature of the contract does not imply that it must endure
across generations unchanged, in a way that precludes the contractors from
using any new information or scientific discovery. Rather, given that the
original position is a device of representation, the ahistorical contract reached
by each generation of contractors will necessarily all imply a rate of use of
natural resources and of emissions that is free from temporal biases. Each
generation will be constrained in its decisions by the available knowledge
about the way economic activities interact with physical phenomena and by the
impossibility to know for how many generations the firm will survive, because
of changes in demand, technology and other random shocks in the wider
economy.
In the next section, I discuss in greater details the Rawlsian notion of
‘‘reciprocity’’ that is key to the ahistorical SC.
4 Reciprocity among generations
The term reciprocity captures an intuition often found in ancient texts and the
Scriptures according to which we should ‘‘Do unto others as you would have them
do unto you’’. The term has found application in the field of behavioral economics
to describe the behavior observed in experiments where simple transfers of
monetary amounts are involved, such as in the ‘‘trust’’ game or the ‘‘ultimatum’’
game (cf. Fehr and Schmidt 2006 for a survey of the literature). Falk and
Fischbacher (2006) define reciprocity as the behavioral response to anticipated acts
of kindness or unkindness of other people. Studies have typically found that
intentions seem only to matter when they come from a human, as opposed to a
computerized random chooser (cf. e.g., Blount 1995). An early study using fMRI
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) to study behavior in the repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma found that subjects playing against another human activate a
richer set of areas of the brain compared to the areas activated in subjects playing
against a computer (Rilling et al. 2002).
If we adopt the definition of reciprocity of Falk and Fischbacher (2006), which is
close to the popular understanding of the term, there seems to be hardly any space
for reciprocity between contemporaries and posterity. Postma (2002) and de Shalit
(1995, pp. 87–111) notice that the inability of posterity to reciprocate the
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contemporaries’ actions renders reciprocity, and Rawls’s theory of intergenerational
justice altogether, unhelpful as an ethical basis for sustainability.7
Rawls’s use of the term reciprocity is, however, quite different from the common
understanding of what this term means, granting a further discussion in this section
of this term. In Rawls’s Political Liberalism reciprocity assumes a distinctively
ethical meaning, as a standard of fairness in intertemporal exchanges. These
exchanges, as already noticed earlier in the paper, appear highly asymmetric, with
the contemporaries being able to affect the welfare of future generations. In Rawls’s
later writings, these aymmetries are ‘‘corrected’’ by the terms of exchange among
the generations, which descend from the view of society as a fair system of
cooperation over time. The term reciprocity is a shorthand for these moralized terms
of exchange among the different generations (Rawls 2005, pp. 14–16).
Reciprocity in Rawls can be viewed as a composite principle that blends two key
elements of social contract ethics, namely impartiality and mutual advantage. The
impartiality of Rawls’s and Sacconi’s social contracts is guaranteed by the
requirement that the contractors adopt the veil of ignorance. The mutual advantage
aspect is most evident in Sacconi’s first SC: each stakeholder can drop out of the
agreement if it does not work to the stakeholder’s advantage, meaning that the
stakeholder does not improve over the status quo through its participation in the
firm.8
Rawls notices that while impartiality is essentially an altruistic concept, mutual
advantage stresses instead one’s payout. The two concepts would thus seem
irreconcilable. Reciprocity comes to the rescue, because it is a:
... relation between citizens expressed by principles of justice that regulate a
social world in which everyone benefits judged with respect to an appropriate
benchmark of equality defined with respect to that world (Rawls 2005, p. 17).
In Rawls, the mutual advantage is not to be defined according to a subject-specific
disagreement point. Rather, ‘‘Rawls develops a conception of the non-agreement
point that is symmetrical: all parties are equally ignorant of how they would do in
the state of nature’’ (Quong 2007, p. 80). Quong points out that a purely mutual
advantage account of the hypothetic agreement reached in the original position
would be hard to reconcile with the original position methodology. It would imply
lifting the veil of ignorance and knowing the specific features of the disagreement
point, the one that would prevail in the absence of an agreement. Several existing
accounts of the social contract have modeled a moralized status quo (e.g., Gauthier
1986 and Binmore 2005) obtained by permutation of the different contractors’
disagreement points. This exercise implies, however, being able to list all the
contractors, and being able to simulate their viewpoints, both arduous tasks in an
intergenerational context. ‘‘Thickening’’ the veil of ignorance in such a way as to
make the decision maker unaware, among other things, of the amount of natural
7 Cf. also Doorn (2010) considering the challenge of ‘‘inclusiveness,’’ i.e., including all relevant actors,
for the application of Rawls’s theory. And Arenas and Rodrigo (2016), discussing how indirect
reciprocity can ease the problems posed by the impossibility of posterity to reciprocate.
8 This is essentially the ‘‘Lockean proviso’’ discussed by Gauthier (1986, p. 205), applied to the
bargaining problem among the stakeholders.
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resources available, is a more promising approach. If the stakeholders in the original
position view themselves as per Rawls’s description, they cannot be moved by the
desire to drop out of the firm in order to emit or use natural resources in an
unsustainable fashion outside of the firm. Any such behavior would violate the view
of society as a moralized system of exchange among generations that breathes life
into the social contract account of sustainability discussed in this paper.
5 Conclusion
In this essay, I have shown that the SC between the firm and its stakeholders, in its
current formulation, does not guarantee a fair treatment of future generations of
stakeholders. The reformulation of the SC I find most defensible views the SC as a
hypothetical ahistorical agreement reached behind a thick veil of ignorance. The norm
that is singled out in this reformulation, reciprocity, asks corporate decision makers to
choose in the same way they wished all past and future generations had chosen
regarding the rate of consumption of natural resources and the rate of emissions.
The governance structure of the firm, i.e., the allocation of decision-making
powers within the organization and the constraints we impose on those powers,
needs to reflect the features of the hypothetical ahistorical agreement discussed in
this paper. The reformulation that views the first SC as a grand assembly of all past,
present and future stakeholders can accommodate the manager’s fiduciary position
toward all stakeholders, at the expense of feasibility and usefulness in practice. In
the case of the ahistorical SC, the fiduciary obligation of the manager with respect to
all stakeholders would be deprived of any reference to time-specific features of the
claim of the stakeholders. Further work remains to be done on how the current
stakeholders and the public regulators might facilitate the representation and
reasoning required by the amended social contract.
An alternative way to introduce a concern for future generations into SC models
is to think of different layers of contracts, from macro to micro, an approach
pioneered by Donaldson and Dunfee (1999). One could describe sustainability as a
‘‘hypernorm’’ that comes from the macro-contract. Hypernorms in the work of
Donaldson and Dunfee (1999) are typically concerned with procedural aspects of
social contracts such as the rights of voice and exit of the different categories.
Future work might consider sustainability as the result of the right of posterity to
‘‘exit,’’ in the sense of a right to non-interference from earlier generations.
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Francés-Gómez P, Del Rio A (2008) Stakeholder’s preference and rational compliance: a comment on
sacconi’s csr as a model for extended corporate governance ii: compliance, reputation and
reciprocity. J Bus Ethics 82(1):59–76
Freeman RE, Reed DL (1983) Stockholders and stakeholders: a new perspective on corporate
governance. Calif Manag Rev 25(3):88–106
Gauthier D (1986) Morals by agreement. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Grossman S, Hart O (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral
integration. J Polit Econ 94(4):691–719
Hart SL (1995) A natural-resource-based view of the firm. Acad Manag Rev 20(4):986–1014
Heede R (2014) Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement
producers, 1854–2010. Clim Change 122(1–2):229–241
Jensen MC (2001) Value maximisation, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective function. Eur
Financ Manag 7(3):297–317
Jeurissen R, Keijzers G (2004) Future generations and business ethics. Bus Ethics Q 14(1):47–69
Mansell SF (2013) Capitalism, corporations and the social contract: a critique of stakeholder theory.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nickel JW (2015) Ethical protections for future persons: Is their present non-existence a serious problem?
J Bus Ethics 127(4):717
Pontara G (1995) Etica e generazioni future. Bari, Laterza
Postma DW (2002) Taking the future seriously: on the inadequacies of the framework of liberalism for
environmental education. J Philos Educ 36(1):41
Quong J (2007) Contractualism, reciprocity, and egalitarian justice. Polit Philos Econ 6(1):75–105
Rawls J (1999 [1971]) A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition ed.). Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press
Rawls J (2005) Political liberalism (Columbia classics in philosophy), 2nd edn. Columbia University
Press, New York
Rilling JK, Gutman DA, Zeh TR, Pagnoni G, Berns GS, Kilts CD (2002) A neural basis for social
cooperation. Neuron 35(2):395–405
Roemer J, Suzumura K (eds) (2007) Intergenerational equity and sustainability. Palgrave Macmillan,
Basingstoke
Sacconi L (2006) A social contract account for csr as an extended model of corporate governance (i):
rational bargaining and justification. J Bus Ethics 68(3):259–281
Sacconi L (2007) A social contract account for csr as an extended model of corporate governance (ii):
compliance, reputation and reciprocity. J Bus Ethics 75(1):77–96
Sen A (2011) The idea of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
338 G. Danese
123
Shrivastava P (1995) The role of corporations in achieving ecological sustainability. Acad Manag Rev
20(4):936–960
Singer A (2015) There is no Rawlsian theory of corporate governance. Bus Ethics Q 25(1):65–92
Speth JG (2008) The bridge at the edge of the world: capitalism, the environment, and crossing from
crisis to sustainability. Yale University Press, New Haven
Stern N (2007) The economics of climate change: the stern review. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge
Steurer R, Langer ME, Konrad A, Martinuzzi A (2005) Corporations, stakeholders and sustainable
development i: a theoretical exploration of business-society relations. J Bus Ethics 61(3):263–281
Tremmel JC (2009) A theory of intergenerational justice. Earthscan, London
Van Oosterhout JH, Heugens PP, Kaptein M (2006) The internal morality of contracting: advancing the
contractualist endeavor in business ethics. Acad Manag Rev 31(3):521–539
Wackernagel M, Rees WE (1997) Perceptual and structural barriers to investing in natural capital:
economics from an ecological footprint perspective. Ecol Econ 20(1):3–24
WCED (1987) Our common future. Oxford University Press, Oxford
A social contract approach to sustainability 339
123
